This paper reports on results from a survey of views on the theory of rational addiction among academics who have contributed to this research. The topic is important because if the literature is viewed by its participants as an intellectual game, then policy makers should be aware of this so as not to derive actual policy from misleading models. A majority of the respondents believe the literature is a success story that demonstrates the power of economic reasoning. At the same time, they also believe the empirical evidence to be weak, and they disagree both on the type of evidence that would validate the theory and the policy implications. These results shed light on how many economists think about model building, evidence requirements and the policy relevance of their work.
Introduction
How seriously should policy-makers and addiction researchers take the theory of rational addiction? On the one hand it has been argued that rational addiction theory is a scientific success story in which a new theory is proposed, tested and validated. In the words of Orphanides and Zervos (1998) the literature initiated by Becker and Murphy (1988) shows that "harmful addictive behavior is largely consistent with the standard axioms of rational, forward looking utility maximization and should no longer be considered a challenge to standard economic analysis." On the other hand, a former editor of American Economic Review once stated, "much of economics is so far removed from anything that remotely resembles the real world that it is often difficult to take the subject seriously" (Clower, 1989) . Rational addiction has been seen by some as exemplifying this: An early variant of rational addiction theory was characterized as "surrealistic" (Winston, 1980) , later theories have been labeled "absurd" (Rogeberg, 2004) , and people outside the field have been puzzled by the attention devoted to "a narrow, highly technical argument made by two economists in an economics journal" (Levine, 2000) . In short, there seems to be great disagreement about the importance of rational addiction theory.
Given the disagreement, the importance of explaining addiction as a phenomenon in itself, and as a case study of economic imperialism in general, it seems worthwhile to investigate how researchers working within this area view their work and the literature. Hence, this is not an article arguing the merits of rational choice theory and its application to the problem of addiction; rather, it is an article about the researchers and how they view their work. This is important because if those working in the field really view the literature as an intellectual game, then policy makers should be aware of this so as not to derive actual policy from toy models. More generally, the survey also sheds light on how academics in the field of rational addiction think about model building, evidence requirements and the policy relevance of their work.
To examine what the field itself thinks about rational addiction theory, we conducted a survey among authors who had published one or more articles about rational addiction. Three main topics are covered. First, do the authors take rational addiction seriously as a plausible theory of addiction? Second, do they agree on the kind of evidence that is relevant to test the theory and the extent to which the rational addiction literature provides this evidence? Third, what, if any, implications do they believe the theory has?
Previous research on the opinions of economists has already established that there is significant normative and positive disagreement on many economic issues (Alston, 1992; Davis, 1997; Frey, 1992) . It also seems that ideology is not the only or major driving force behind these disagreements (Caplan, 2002; Mayer 1 2001) . No previous survey has been conducted on the topic of rational addiction, but Goldfarb et al. (2001) has shown that theories of addiction may be underdetermined in the sense that the data may not be sufficient to distinguish among competing theories. In addition, Yuengert (2006) has demonstrated that multiple research goals can lead to different evaluations of rational addiction theory. Hence, the contribution of the current survey is not mainly to argue that there is disagreement or express surprise at the fact that there seems to be a tendency to arrive at different conclusions when faced with the same evidence. Instead, and in contrast to previous surveys of economists, the current survey is limited to one issue and focuses explicitly on the link between the three main topics within this area (overall views, evidence, implications). By combining and contrasting the three types of questions in one limited area, it becomes possible not only to discover disagreements, but also to reveal puzzling internal tensions. For example, one of the major results from the current survey is that concomitant with the attitude that the theory of rational addiction represents a success story with strong implications is an acknowledgment that the empirical evidence is often very weak.
Method
The survey was limited to researchers who had published articles with the phrase "rational addiction" in the title, as a keyword or in the abstract of the article. Working papers, books and publications in languages other than English were excluded. In order to create a list of the most important papers and authors, we created a database with the top 200 references from google.scholar using the search phrase "rational addiction" and combined this with the results from searches in EconLit, ISI Web of Science and PubMed using the phrase "Rational Addiction." Ultimately, these searches yielded a list of 111 articles with 156 authors or co-authors.
Both e-mail and regular mail was used to invite authors to give their views on the literature. Thirty-four authors were lost because of incomplete contact information. Of 122 individuals invited to participate, 64 completed the survey (52%). Although comparable to other opinion surveys, the response rate raises the possibility of selection bias. To preserve the anonymity of the respondents the survey did not ask about gender, age and other characteristics since this could easily lead to identification in the small field of rational addiction research. However, the small size of the field is also an advantage. The respondents do not represent a small sample of a large population, but a large sample of a small population. Because of this one may use the results as an indicator of the opinions of a large share of researchers active within rational addiction even if one is not willing to generalize the results to rational addiction researchers in general.
The survey consisted of 25 questions, most of which were in the form of statements to which respondents indicated their extent of agreement/disagreement on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 was "I completely disagree" and 5 was "I completely agree." For the sake of simplicity, the results are reported in terms of how many agree and disagree instead of reporting the distribution for all five possible answer categories. For readers interested in these numbers or alternative breakdowns, both the questionnaire and the raw data are freely available from the authors.
Results and discussion
It has been argued, "Economics has increasingly become an intellectual game played for its own sake and not for its practical consequences for understanding the economic world" (Blaug, 1998) . While perhaps true, survey results seem to indicate that this sentiment is not widely shared by rational addiction researchers. A small, but not insignificant, number of respondents agreed that rational addiction theory is part of an intellectual game with no practical significance (17%). Instead, a large majority of the respondents, 72%, believed that rational addiction theory "illustrates the power of economic analysis." This is comforting in the sense that it indicates that the participants really do believe in their work as having importance beyond getting papers published.
For those who argue that rational addiction theories are patently absurd, the dominant belief that the theory illustrates the power of economic analysis may be more unsettling than comforting. In order for a theory to be powerful it should ideally have solid empirical foundations and important implications. Unless these conditions are satisfied, the strong belief in the theory may be unsettling as a sign of ideological arrogance in the face of empirical facts. For this reason it is interesting to examine exactly what makes respondents believe the theory and the implications they believe it has.
Testing a theory requires consensus on the kind of evidence that is relevant and the interpretation of that evidence. There are many possible model selection criteria but the rational addiction literature has typically focused on whether the theory is consistent with data on the demand for drugs and price changes. There seems to be a general consensus about the relevance of this type of evidence (see Table 1 ). For instance, a large majority agreed that the theory should be consistent with macro-level evidence on the demand for addictive goods (74%). Interestingly, the kind of evidence believed to be most relevant was also that which many respondents believed provided weak support for the theory. Only 27% agreed that the theory was consistent with the macro-evidence on elasticities and consumption patterns. There was less agreement on the relevance of evidence at the individual level about how people actually make decisions. A majority, 57%, believed the theory should be consistent with evidence of this kind, but 20% disagreed. To some extent this reflects the attitude that all that matters is whether the model acts "as-if" it is compatible with macro implications that come out of the model as opposed to the behavioral assumptions that go into the model.
As for the assumptions that go into that model there was, surprisingly, no general consensus on whether rational addiction theory should be based on the standard axioms of economic choice theory. The contribution by Becker and Murphy (1988) claims to be an extension of this framework, but the respondents are divided about whether this is how we should model addiction. Part of the reason for this may be that interpretations of the standard theory differ. For instance, following Becker and Murphy (1988) the standard approach often employs exponential discounting. Other contributions emphasize hyperbolic discounting, weakness of will or related mechanisms that can create timeinconsistent behavior (Ainslie, 1991; Loewenstein, 1999) . One might argue that the precise functional form of time preferences is not an essential axiom of the standard rational choice frame and since opinions on this differ, the respondents also give different answers.
One of the questions that divided the field most was whether the theory of rational addiction should be interpreted as an "as-if" theory. The rational addiction literature has often been criticized for making very strong assumptions about the rationality of the individuals who engage in substance abuse. Typically the users are not only seen as capable of responding to incentives, but as also being able to create a long term drug-use plan, which takes into account how use will affect their future desire to use drugs (i.e., rational taste-planning). When confronted with the criticism that many substance users seem not to have such a plan for their career, the usual defense is Friedman's (1953) "as-if" justification: All that matters is whether the agents act as if their behavior is determined by a rational plan of how much to consume at various points in time, not whether the addicts actually make a rational plan. 38% of the respondents in the survey agreed with this "as-if" argument, while 43% disagreed. Moreover, even those who agreed that an "as-if" model was enough for the theory to be relevant, did not believe that consumers of addictive goods actually behave "as-if" the models were correct. Only 27% of the sample agreed that the consumers behave "as-if" the model was correct. Given the hesitation about whether the theory is empirically verified, one might expect similar hesitation about the insights the theory has to offer or its usefulness in policy analysis (Table 2 ). In fact, the respondents split into two roughly equal and opposing factions when asked whether the rational addiction literature provided insight that were relevant for how to treat addictions: 39% agreed and 42% disagreed. One might also expect that those who are reluctant to draw treatment implications from the theory are the same individuals who only take the theory as an "as-if" theory since they focus more on predictive success than explanatory success. However, a cross-tabulation of the answers shows that almost half of the "as-if" adherents also argued that the rational addiction literature had implications for treatment of addicts.
The same puzzling gap between the empirical evidence behind the theory and claims about the theory's insights can be seen when the respondents are asked about aggregate policy implications. A majority agree that the theory gives insight into the welfare consequences of addictive goods (56%) at the same time that they do not believe one of its major assumptions -that addicts rationally choose an optimal and welfare maximizing path of consumption over time (27% agreed with this). Similarly, while agreeing that the empirical basis was weak, 73% agreed that the literature extends and enriches consumer theory.
There are at least two main possible interpretations of the gap between the claim of success and the believed lack of empirical support for important aspects of the theory of rational addiction. The charitable interpretation is that although the participants judge the theory to be empirically shaky, the part that is believed to be true yields enough insight to judge the literature as an overall success. The less charitable interpretation would be to argue that the survey reveals a puzzling belief that a theory can be used to derive important and valid policy implications even when its assumptions are not believed and the theory is admitted to have weak empirical support. To distinguish between these two interpretations would require a more subjective assessment of the value of the insights and whether they are enough to qualify as a success story.
To investigate whether the data contained patterns of answers that would fit into a few easily identified stereotypes -such as supporters and critics of rational addiction theory -we used factor analysis. If supporters of rational addiction theory tend to give the same response to different questions then we would expect a single factor to explain a large share of the answers in Tables 1  and 2 . The factor analysis based on these questions shows that 59% of the overall variance could be explained by one factor. When two factors were allowed in the model 77% of the variance in the answers could be explained by these two unknown factors. The factor loadings (see Table 3 ) show that the responses about implications of the theory are the key variables underlying factor 1. This suggests that factor 1 may represent the general attitude that rational addiction theory is a success story.
Interestingly, the results from the analysis also suggest that it is too simplistic to divide the respondents into supporters and critics of rational choice theory. The analysis indicates a second split related to views about the evidence believed to be relevant to test the theory. The underlying factor behind the answers in this category could be labeled methodological orientation and including this category substantially increases the amount of variation that can be explained. This is important because it indicates that methodological views do not follow the same fault lines as the split between supporters and critics of rational addiction theory. However, factor 2 is weaker than factor 1 and one should be careful not to overstate the findings from factor analysis. It merely summarizes the responses in terms of unknown underlying factors and different researchers may present different interpretations of the same pattern. In this sense the findings are suggestive, but not conclusive. Tables 1 and 2 and the text in this column refer to the short label for variables.
Conclusion
Rational addiction theory is an important theory in the sense that it has received much attention in the economic literature on addiction. The results in this paper show that a majority of addiction researchers also believe it is an academic success story, but that there is more disagreement regarding the type of evidence needed to evaluate the theory, the degree of empirical support for the theory and the welfare implications of rational addiction theory. The respondents split into two almost equal factions on the validity of the "as-if" justification and on the question of whether the theory has practical implications relevant for treatment. A majority believes the empirical evidence is weak and the factor analysis suggests that there is more to the split than a one-dimensional division between supporters and critics of the theory of rational addiction.
